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This study examines the relationship between religious affiliation, church 
attendance, and attitudes towards immigration.  Following the ethnoreligious perspective, 
I predict that those who identify as Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, or 
Catholic will hold more positive attitudes than those who do not affiliate, which would 
reflect the teachings of their churches.  I also predict that Catholics may have particularly 
positive attitudes because of social identity theory.  Attending church services should be 
associated with more positive attitudes, according to religious restructuralism.  Using 
2006 telephone survey data of 1,135 Nebraskans from the Nebraska Annual Social 
Indicators Survey (NASIS), I use binary logistic regression to test these theories and their 
effect on seven separate measures of immigration attitudes.  I found that while affiliating 
with one of the religious groups did not lead to more positive attitudes, attending church 
services at least once a week was associated with more positive attitudes on the topics of 
government spending on immigrants and immigrants and crime.  Results partially support 
religious restructuralism and the theory that church attendance, not merely identifying 
with a religious group, is what can improve attitudes towards immigration.   
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From its formation, immigrants have traveled to the United States in search of a 
better life.  Many immigrants from around the world continue to make the journey; from 
the years 2000 to 2010, almost nine million newcomers made the U.S. their home 
(Migration Policy Institute 2011).  Mexicans in particular comprise a growing proportion 
of these newcomers.  An estimated 11.5 million lived in the U.S. in 2009, which was 
almost one third of all immigrants in the country (Passel and Cohn 2009).  The successful 
adjustment of these immigrants to life in the U.S. depends in part on the response of the 
native-born population, making their attitudes towards immigration a relevant area of 
study. 
 Possible issues shaping individual attitudes on immigration are religious 
affiliation and attendance to religious services.  Religion as a determinant has been 
“virtually ignored” in previous literature (Brenneman 2008), but recent research has 
shown that an individual’s religious affiliation and rate of attendance are associated with 
attitudes towards immigrants (Brenneman 2008; Von Der Ruhr and Daniels 2003; Knoll 
2009; Daniels and Von der Ruhr 2005).  These measures, therefore, could offer an 
additional explanation to negative attitudes towards our nation’s most recent wave of 
immigrants.   
 The most recent immigrants have settled at a much higher rate in the Midwest 
rather than on the coasts (Fry 2008).  Nebraska is one of the Midwestern states 
experiencing this surge in the foreign-born, mostly due to the growing food-processing 
industry in rural communities (Dalla 2005).  Immigration to the more rural communities 
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in these states warrants closer study to examine how attitudes may be shaped in these 
areas specifically rather than looking only at the national level as a whole.   
 Using the 2006 Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey (NASIS), this study 
will explore the relationships between religious affiliation, attendance and attitudes 
towards immigration of individuals in the state of Nebraska.  Specifically, does one’s 
religious affiliation as Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, or lack of 
affiliation influence one’s opinions of immigrants and immigration?  Based on Green’s 
(2007) ethnoreligious perspective and Tajfel’s and Turner’s (1979) social identity theory, 
I predict that immigration attitudes will vary by membership in these groups.   
This study will also examine the relationship between religious attendance and 
immigration attitudes, regardless of religious affiliation.  Researchers have found that 
attendance to religious services can be a factor for whether church beliefs influence 
individual beliefs (Green 2007; Lee 2002; Zaller 1992).  Therefore, it is necessary to 
measure whether the frequency of attending religious services affects immigration 
attitudes, rather than just looking at the religious affiliation to which one belongs.  Based 
on Green’s religious restructuralism theory, I predict that frequency of attendance will 
also be associated with attitudes towards immigrants.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 An extensive body of literature exists on what shapes attitudes towards 
immigrants.  Among the variables studied, religious affiliation and the frequency of 
attending religious services could be a significant factor.  Literature has also shown that 
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one’s religious affiliation and frequency of attendance has the capacity to shape other 
attitudes, providing justification to examine these possible determinants further and how 
they may be associated with attitudes towards immigrants.    
 
Determinants of Attitudes towards Immigration 
 Although exploring how religion and immigration attitudes are linked is a 
relatively new area of research, examining how individual’s views on immigration are 
shaped has been a continued effort by researchers in the field, and many possible 
determinants have been identified.  Partly because of a self-interested orientation and 
perception of a competition for jobs, researchers have studied extensively how 
individuals’ education, income, and skill-level are associated with attitudes towards 
immigration.  More recently, however, researchers have looked at how all of these 
variables may be related to each other in shaping individual attitudes in a variable they 
call “cosmopolitanism”.   
One’s education has been found to lead to positive attitudes towards immigration 
(Simon 1985; Moore 1986; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Von der Ruhr and Daniels 2003; 
McDaniel et al. 2011), partially because it is oftentimes lower-educated workers who 
actually must compete with immigrants for jobs.  Using data from the 1994 General 
Social Survey, Chandler and Tsai (2001) were able to examine a variety of possible 
variables and found that having a college education had the most impact on immigration 
views.  “College education seems to be a powerful agent for engendering pro-
immigration sentiment,” they concluded (185).  Although their research focused solely on 
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attitudes towards undocumented immigration, Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) found 
further evidence that education contributes to more positive attitudes.   
Because of the association between education and income, one would expect 
income to also be associated with immigration attitudes.  However, income has not 
always shown an effect and oftentimes leads to mixed results (Citrin et al. 1997; Wilson 
1994).  Dustmann and Preston (2007) actually found that higher income was linked with 
more negative immigration attitudes compared to those with a lower income possibly, 
they said, because of the fear that taxes would go to immigrants in the form of welfare.  
However, Citrin et al. (1997) found that personal economic circumstances, including 
income, were of little importance in determining attitudes towards immigration policy.   
However, a worker’s skill-level has been found to be associated with immigration 
attitudes.  Both Polavieja and Ortega (2010) and Mayda (2006) found that those who 
worked in higher-skilled jobs were less threatened by low-skilled immigrants.  Both 
Haubert and Fussell (2006) and Dustmann and Preston (2007) found that labor market 
competition between immigrants and native-born low-skill manual workers results in 
more negative attitudes towards immigrants.    
Previous research has found a relationship between living in a rural area and more 
negative immigration attitudes.  Many studies analyzed support for increases or decreases 
in immigration levels and found that rural residents held more restrictionist policy views 
towards immigration (Fennelly and Federico 2008; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade 
and Hempstead 1996).  Both Greenberg et al. (2004) and Bean et al. (2000) found that 
rural residents thought that immigrants impinged on their quality of life.  There is a 
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perception that most immigrants are undocumented (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996), 
and Fennelly and Federico (2008) point out that “this perception may be particularly 
prevalent in rural communities where food processing and agricultural businesses employ 
large numbers of undocumented workers” (153).   
Past research has found that political ideology has some effect on immigration 
attitudes, especially if one views immigration as a matter of public policy (Chandler and 
Tsai 2001; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1990; Von der Ruhr and Daniels 2003).  
These studies have found that having a more liberal ideology is associated with more 
positive immigration attitudes or with being more open to increasing numbers of 
immigrants.  Similarly, age is often found to be negatively associated with immigration 
attitudes, with attitudes becoming more negative as age increases (Von der Ruhr and 
Daniels 2003; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996).   
One reason that more urban, educated, or liberal people have more positive 
immigration attitudes could be because of a more global worldview, or what has been 
called by researchers as “cosmopolitanism”.  Measured by variables such as education, 
job skill-level, whether one has traveled abroad, and holding liberal values, many studies 
have shown that a more global perspective can be associated with more positive 
immigration attitudes (Betts 1988; Bean 1995; Haubert and Fussell 2006; Chandler and 
Tsai 2001).   
Gender has shown to have some effect on immigration attitudes.  Females are 
usually found to have more positive attitudes (Chandler and Tsai 2001).  These findings 
follow previous research that find that females tend to have a more “other”-oriented 
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perspective when compared to males because of differences in gender socialization 
(Beutel and Marini 1995; Cross and Madson 1997), especially when regarding race 
(Johnson and Marini 1998).  For example, according to Beutel and Marini (1995), 
females are more likely than males to express concern and responsibility for the well-
being of others, probably as a result of differences in how they are raised.  This empathy 
for others could also pertain to immigrants and result in more positive attitudes towards 
them. 
Researchers have studied how cultural determinants can influence attitudes 
towards immigration, regardless of one’s own individual characteristics.  One theory is 
that native-born individuals feel a sense of threat to their culture and everyday life, rather 
than threat to their economic well-being.  Quillian (1995) calls this “group threat” and 
defines it as “the perception by the dominant group that an outside group threatens their 
group’s prerogatives” (586).  McLaren (1996), Tajfel (1982), and Hood and Morris 
(1998) focus on this feeling of group identity and the feelings of threat it can raise 
towards an out-group.  Brenneman (2008) points out that “negative attitudes toward 
immigrants…are often based more on cultural and identity threats than on actual 
competition for resources” (9).  For example, Chandler and Tsai (2001) found that a 
perceived cultural threat to the English language had the most impact on immigration 
views.   
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Religious Affiliation and Attendance as a Determinant of Individual Attitudes 
 Like the factors above, religious affiliation and attendance could be important 
determinants in better understanding how attitudes are formed.  Studies have shown that 
one’s religious beliefs can actually shape one’s attitudes on various topics that may not be 
clearly religious in nature.  Steensland et al. (2000) assert that “Americans are more 
involved in religious groups than in any other type of voluntary organization, and the 
breadth and depth of this involvement exert a strong influence on contemporary social 
and political issues” (309).  For example, religion has been shown to influence civic 
participation, activism, and even election outcomes.  Welch and Leege (1988) found that 
Catholics’ religious practices and beliefs influenced their sociopolitical beliefs and 
political ideology, moving them towards more liberal views.  Green (2007) found that 
presidential voting preferences often depend on religious affiliation, with those in some 
minority religious groups more likely to vote for Democratic candidates.  Wald et al. 
(1988) argued that the ideology of a church influences the individual political ideology of 
its members.  Verba et al. (1995) demonstrated that increased religious participation was 
associated with increased levels of civic participation such as voting and participation in 
political activism.  If individuals view immigration as a public policy issue, religious 
affiliation could also influence individual opinions on immigration.  With immigration 
policy constantly being a political talking point among politicians and a mainstay of 
divisive campaign rhetoric each election cycle, being more vocal about immigration may 
be a part of the increased political activism among those who affiliate with a religious 
group and attend services. 
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Also closely linked to the potential for influencing immigration attitudes, is the 
consistent finding that one’s religious affiliation influences one’s stance on certain moral 
issues.  Such studies have found that attitudes on abortion (Leege 1983), same-sex 
marriage (Wood and Bartkowski 2004; Whitehead 2010), and euthanasia (Hamil-Luker 
and Smith 1998; Sikora 2009) can all be shaped by one’s religious tradition.  
Immigration, if couched in a humanitarian or human rights context, could be viewed as a 
possible moral issue similar to these.  Therefore, if individuals see immigration as a 
political or moral issue either in addition to or instead of solely an economic issue, this 
research shows that religion as a determinant should not be overlooked.   
Some research has shown that how often (or whether) one attends religious 
services is important in shaping individual views.  For example, McIntosh et al. (1979) 
found in their study of white Protestants and Catholics that those who attended church 
more frequently were more likely to be anti-abortion regardless of denominational 
preference.  In studying attitudes towards euthanasia, Sikora (2009) showed that both 
religious denomination and attendance mattered, with those with higher levels of 
attendance being more likely to be against euthanasia.  Similarly, Michaud (2008) found 
that church attendance was a better predictor than religious denomination of 
environmental attitudes towards climate change.  Green (2007) demonstrated that 
religious attendance was associated with presidential voting preferences, with those who 
attend more often being more likely to vote for the Republican candidate over the 
Democrat.  
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 Furthermore, Green found that those who attended church more often were more 
“religiously salient”, meaning that respondents believed that religion dictated much of 
their lives.  In general, past research has found that those who attend church more 
frequently are more likely to hold beliefs that are consistent with the church and follow 
the endorsements of the church leaders (Lee 2002; Zaller 1992).  This research suggests 
that an individual’s thinking will more likely reflect church doctrine when the individual 
attends church, not just if they identify with that religion.   
 
Religious Affiliation, Attendance and Immigration Attitudes 
 Recent research has provided evidence that there is a relationship between 
religious affiliation and immigration attitudes and has found that attitudes towards 
immigration varied depending on religious affiliation (Knoll 2009; Brenneman 2008; 
Daniels and von der Ruhr 2005).  Exactly how each religious group influences 
immigration attitudes may vary depending on each church’s teachings.   
 To explore how immigration attitudes may vary among Mainline Protestants, 
Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics in the study and between those who do and do not 
affiliate with a religious group, it is necessary to understand what each of the churches’ 
beliefs are on the issue of immigration  Instead of looking directly at church doctrine, 
which can be often be interpreted differently and selectively depending on each 
individual, it may be more useful to examine direct cues from religious leaders.  These 
cues may have more potential than doctrine to be heard and internalized by church 
members (Knoll 2009).  Much research has demonstrated the possibility that public 
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political statements and agreement by church clergy can influence church members’ 
attitudes on various issues (Djupe and Gilbert 2002; Smidt 2004; Campbell and Monson 
2003).  Knoll (2009) adds that “is it possible that members of religious traditions and 
denominations whose leaders officially and/or publicly endorse a certain type of 
immigration reform should be more likely to support those same reform policies” (315).
 However, it should be noted that other literature exists that finds that clergy, 
especially those in Evangelical denominations, hold different views (possibly more 
positive towards immigration) than their congregants (.  Regardless, it is still possible that 
positive messages on immigration are reaching members even if many members still hold 
less positive views than their clergy. 
The three religious affiliations in this analysis, the Catholic, Evangelical 
Protestant, and Mainline Protestant churches, have all been outright about their positive 
support for immigrants and immigration reform that would benefit immigrants.  The 
Catholic Church, especially, has been very strong in its support for immigrants and 
immigration reform.  According to the website of the U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, their position is as follows: “We bishops commit ourselves and all the members 
of our church communities to continue the work of advocacy for laws that respect the 
human rights of immigrants and preserve the unity of the immigrant family… We join 
with others of good will in a call for legalization opportunities for the maximum number 
of undocumented persons, particularly those who have built equities and otherwise 
contributed to their communities” (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 2002).   
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 Leaders of Evangelical Protestant churches, although more diverse than Catholics 
because different denominations are included, have also expressed support for 
immigrants.  The Southern Baptist Church, the largest Evangelical denomination in the 
United States (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2010), has endorsed a guest-
worker program for undocumented immigrants and also expressed support for granting 
amnesty (Land 2006).  Richard Land, head of the Ethics and Religious Liberty 
Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, has said, “We have an obligation to 
support the government and the government’s laws for consience’ [sic] sake (Romans 
13:7)… As citizens of the Lord’s heavenly Kingdom and members of local colonies of 
that Kingdom, we also have a divine mandate to act redemptively and compassionately 
toward those who are in need” (Land 2006).   
Leith Anderson, president of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), has 
expressed support for immigrants as have other leaders in the organization (Vu 2009).  
NAE even has a humanitarian branch called World Relief that provides legal services to 
immigrants, helps settle refugees, and provides other assistance such as English classes.  
Officially, the organization points to the biblical foundations for welcoming immigrants 
and supports expanded avenues through which immigrants can enter the U.S., emphasis 
on family reunification, and ways for those who are undocumented to earn legal status 
(NAE 2009).     
 Mainline Protestant churches, although also more diverse than the Catholic 
Church, have shown their support as well.  The website of the Episcopalian Migration 
Ministries quotes their Presiding Bishop: “To make enforcement a central provision of 
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our immigration policy not only fails to honor our historic tradition of offering refuge to 
the oppressed, but also denies the call of Christ to welcome the stranger as if we were 
receiving Him as our guest” (Griswold 2006).  The Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
America (ELCA) stated that it supports a plan to “provide a path to permanence for 
individuals currently residing and working in the United States as well as their families” 
(Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 2007).  The United Methodist (Gilbert 2007) 
and the Presbyterian Church (Presbyterian Church (USA) Office of Immigration Issues 
2006) have similar statements on their respective websites.   
 Only a few studies exist that examine how religion, whether measured through 
affiliation or attendance, can affect immigration attitudes.  Much of this research focuses 
on immigration policy preferences and the economy and not on feelings towards 
immigrants or their possible impact. For example, both Von der Ruhr and Daniels (2003) 
and Daniels and Von der Ruhr (2005) measured whether religious affiliation affected 
whether respondents believed immigration levels should be increased, decreased, or kept 
stable.  In the 2003 study, Jewish respondents were more likely to prefer that the number 
of immigrants be increased, and in both 2003 and 2005 they found that those who 
belonged to more fundamentalist denominations supported more restrictionist 
immigration policies.  
Similarly, McDaniel et al. (2011) in a national survey measured level of negative 
attitudes towards immigrants with an index of eight items including whether the 
respondent believed immigrants were a burden, did not pay taxes or learn English, took 
jobs away from native-born, or threatened traditional American values.  They found 
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support for what they called “Christian nationalism” in Evangelical Protestants, and that 
this negatively affected their views of immigrants compared to Catholics and Mainline 
Protestants.  They defined Christian nationalism as “a religiously informed interpretation 
of America’s national identity” and that Christian nationalists “believe that America has a 
divinely inspired mission and link its success to God’s favor” (205).  In other words, 
those who ascribed to Christian nationalism believed that immigrants were a threat to an 
existing American identity and that Evangelical Protestants were more likely to hold this 
belief than other religious groups.   
 Brenneman (2008) used 1994 General Social Survey data to examine how 
religious affiliation and attendance affects immigration attitudes.  Here, Catholics were 
more likely than other religious groups to be supportive of continued or increased levels 
of immigration.  One explanation, however, was that the national sample contained more 
Catholics who were probably immigrants themselves.  Jewish respondents were found to 
have more open views as well compared to the other religious groups.  Brenneman also 
found that those who attended church more frequently were also more supportive of 
continued or increased levels of immigration.   
 Knoll (2009) used 2006 Immigration Survey data collected by the Pew Hispanic 
Center to measure whether religious affiliation or attendance affected respondents’ views 
on immigration policy preferences.  Higher rates of attendance across denominations 
were strongly associated with more liberal policy preferences (guest worker programs 
and amnesty).  Again Jewish as well as Latter Day Saints Protestants held more liberal 
policy attitudes.   
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Therefore, recent research on the focal relationship of religious affiliation and 
attendance on immigration attitudes has been limited and produced mixed results.  Some 
studies showed evidence of negative attitudes among Evangelicals and fundamentalists 
and positive attitudes among Catholics, but these findings have not been consistent across 
multiple studies.  Furthermore, this research uses only national samples, which fails to 
look at effects that could be unique to smaller geographic areas.  Dependent measures of 
immigration attitudes is largely based on policy preferences gained only using one or two 
survey items and not on more comprehensive measures that past literature on 
immigration attitudes show is possible (such as attitudes on how immigration affects 
culture or crime rates).  By surveying respondents about how they believe immigration 
affects the economy, a community’s cultural diversity, crime, and their opinions on 
government policies concerning immigration, this research attempts to encapsulate more 
of the potential ways that individuals could express immigration attitudes and not just 
broad policy preferences such as to whether they think immigration levels should change.   
  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 Three theories shape the theoretical bases for my hypotheses: Green’s (2007) 
ethnoreligious perspective, his religious restructuralism perspective, and Tajfel’s and 
Turner’s (1979) Social Identity theory.  The ethnoreligioius perspective asserts that there 
is a direct link between one’s religious tradition and individual attitudes.  It is in the self-
identification of a particular denomination (along with those denomination’s traditions, 
values, beliefs, and cues from church leaders) and not necessarily church attendance that 
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drives the effect of religious affiliation on personal attitudes.  For example, Catholics 
who no longer attend church may still hold beliefs that follow Catholic teachings because 
of prior socialization.  Although Green originally used the theory to describe differences 
in political behavior, Knoll (2009) argued the theory could also explain differences in 
immigration attitudes among denominations.  If this theory holds here, we should expect 
members of the three religious affiliations to reflect the positive messages of their 
respective churches compared to those who do not affiliate.  Although some research has 
found that Evangelical Protestants hold more restrictionist or negative views, others have 
not and I expect that the ethnoreligious theory will apply and positive doctrine and 
messages will be salient.   
 Social Identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) states that people identify with 
and behave as part of in-groups and may display prejudice feelings and discriminatory 
actions against those who are not part of that group.  In other words, one’s self concept is 
derived from group memberships.  Part of the theory is that members maximize 
differences between those not in the in-group to strengthen one’s own identity as part of 
the in-group.  These distinct social groups form as a result of these in-groups and out-
groups and can result in differences in attitudes and behavior between these groups, 
especially the behavior of one group towards another (Hogg et al. 1995).  Because 
members of religious groups self-identify in this survey, they could be viewed as 
constituting social groups which differentiate from each other, meaning that there could 
be differences in how members of each religious group think about immigration.   
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One important factor is that many immigrants, especially those arriving in 
Nebraska, are Catholic.  According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2009), seventy-four 
percent of the foreign born are Catholic, most of who are Latinos.  From 2000 to 2010, 
Nebraska’s population growth was sixty-three percent Hispanic (United States Census 
2010).  Because immigrants arriving in Nebraska are more likely to be Catholic and 
because Catholics may perceive immigrants as more likely to be Catholic, Catholics in 
this study may hold more positive immigration attitudes if the tenets of Social Identity 
theory hold true.  Furthermore, Catholics in particular have a long history in the United 
States as an oppressed minority group.  Once a target of the Ku Klux Klan and other 
white power groups, Catholics may still feel a connection and in-group tie to this 
historical legacy.  Additionally, the Catholic Church already has a more clearly defined 
pro-immigrant stance, a more structured hierarchal system to communicate that stance, 
and a richer history of supporting immigrants than the other religious groups, meaning 
that the ethnoreligious theory could apply as well.   
The religious restructuralism perspective predicts that it is the commitment and 
behavior in religion of each individual that has the most impact on individual attitudes, 
rather than denomination. Therefore, in addition to religious affiliation, it is important to 
examine how commitment to that religion might matter in shaping immigration attitudes.  
Green measures commitment by how often the respondent attends religious services.  
Because of each church’s positive stance on immigration, we should find that going to 
church improves attitudes. 
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Following the above theoretical framework, the hypotheses are: 
H1: Those who affiliate as Catholic, Mainline Protestant, or Evangelical Protestant will 
hold more positive attitudes towards immigration than those who are unaffiliated.   
 
H2: Catholics will hold more positive attitudes towards immigration than the other 
religious groups. 
 
H3:  Attendance, regardless of religious affiliation, will have a positive association with 
attitudes towards immigration. 
 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 tests the ethnoreligious perspective, Hypothesis 2 tests 
both ethnoreligious perspective and social identity theory, and Hypothesis 3 tests 
religious restructuralism.   
 
DATA 
This study will analyze individual attitudes by using the 2006 Nebraska Annual 
Social Indicators Survey (NASIS), a random digit dialing telephone survey of 1,821 
adults in Nebraska conducted by the Bureau of Sociological Research (BOSR) at the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln.  BOSR has conducted the cross-sectional survey on the 
quality of life in Nebraska since 1977, and issues covered vary from year to year.  The 
sampling frame used is non-institutionalized persons living in households with listed 
telephone numbers across Nebraska, excluding those under 19 years of age, those in 
custodial institutions and on military reservations, and those without telephones.  Once a 
person is reached within the sampling frame, the person in the household to be 
interviewed is chosen based on a computer-generated random number.  People without 
listed telephone numbers or without telephones are in our population but not able to be in 
the sampling frame. 
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For all variables, those with missing cases were dropped and not included in the 
analysis.  Although, the full dataset includes 1,821 people, after dropping those who were 
not categorized into one of the four religious groups in the analysis (Mainline Protestant, 
Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, and Unaffiliated) or who did not answer the 
demographic variables used, the total number of respondents used for the analysis comes 
to 1,135.   Total n drops to 965 for analyses only among those who affiliate with a 
religious group.  For each regression, missing data from the seven dependent variables 
was also dropped.  Therefore, each dependent variable has a different n, but this method 
prevents respondents from being dropped from the analysis who failed to answer all 
seven survey questions used to form the dependent variables.  A description of all 
variables used for analyses can be found in Table 1. 
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
Because of the sampling procedure utilized, the data used for this analysis should 
be fairly representative of Nebraskans as a whole.  As expected with telephone surveys, 
older respondents were overrepresented, with 25.6% of this sample being over 65, while 
2009 American Community Survey (ACS) estimates predict the number is only 13.3%.  
Following this trend, those in the sample who were 45 to 64 made up 41.8%, but make up 
only 25.0% of ACS estimates.  Younger respondents were underrepresented, with only 
4.2% of the sample being 19 to 24, with 11.0% of ACS respondents being 18 to 24.  ACS 
estimates the number of 25-44 year-olds to be 36.7%, with only 28.4% of the sample 
being in this age group.  Females were also overrepresented at 59.8% of the sample but 
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only 50.7% of Census estimates (2010).  Weights were calculated for each respondent 
according to these variables and used for each analysis.   
 
Dependent Variables 
 Seven separate variables were used to measure respondents’ attitudes towards 
immigration.  Topics covered include government spending on immigrants and 
immigration’s effect on crime, diversity, and the economy.  These areas reflect previous 
literature’s findings on how respondents voice these attitudes and allow for higher 
content validity of the overall measure of immigration attitudes.  Although some of the 
items reflect similar content, I chose to study them individually because of low 
Cronbach’s alphas when combined.  Refer to Table 2 for the distribution and n’s of these 
variables.  
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
There were two 5-item formats to these questions.  The first ranged from strongly 
agreed to strongly disagreed.  Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed 
with one of the following scenarios: “immigrants improve the economy of my 
community”, “the government spends too much money assisting immigrants”, and 
“immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural diversity of my community”.  Variables 
were reverse coded so that 1=”strongly disagree”, 2= “disagree”, 3= “neither agree or 
disagree”, 4= “agree”, and 5= “strongly agree”.   
The second format ranged from very likely to very unlikely.  Respondents were 
asked if the following scenarios were likely or unlikely when asked “What do you think 
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will happen as a result of more immigrants to your community”: “higher economic 
growth”, “people born in my community losing their jobs”, “higher crime rates”, and 
“making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”.  Variables were reverse 
coded so that 1=”very unlikely”, 2= “somewhat unlikely”, 3= “neither likely or unlikely”, 
4= “somewhat likely”, and 5= “very likely”. 
Respondents were particularly negative on the topics of government spending on 
immigration and how they thought immigration affected crime rates.  An overwhelming 
majority of those surveyed (69.6%) agreed with the statement that “the government 
spends too much money assisting immigrants”, with only 19.2% disagreeing.  Over two-
thirds of the sample (67.8%) said that “higher crime rates” were likely as a result of more 
immigrants coming to their community.  Well over a quarter (28.9%) responded that 
higher crime rates were “very likely”.  Similarly, about half (49.1%) disagreed that 
“immigrants improve the economy of my community”, and 53.9% thought it was 
unlikely that immigration would result in “higher economic growth”.  Respondents were 
divided on how likely the scenario of  “people born in my community losing their jobs” 
would be due to immigration, with 47.9% saying that it was unlikely and 46.0% saying it 
was likely.   
Respondents were more positive about the possibility for more diversity and 
openness.  Over half (57.5%) agreed that “immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural 
diversity of my community”.  Two-thirds (66%) thought it was likely that immigration 
was “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”.     
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 For analysis, these response choices were collapsed into dichotomous variables, 
with “strongly agree”/“very likely” and “agree”/“somewhat likely”=1 and “neither agree 
or disagree”/“neither likely or unlikely”, “disagree”/“somewhat unlikely”, and “strongly 
disagree”/“very unlikely”=0.  In other words, those coded as 1 are all respondents who 
agreed with the statement of each dependent variable or thought the scenario in that 
statement was likely with immigration.   
 
Independent Variables 
 Respondents were grouped into four separate religious affiliations: Catholics, 
Mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, and Unaffiliated.  These groups were 
formed using the RELTRAD classification method, which groups single denominations 
into seven larger groups by those sharing similar doctrine and religious tradition 
(Steensland et al. 2000).  In determining the categorization of denominations as either 
Evangelical or Mainline, Steensland et al. (2000) note that “Mainline denominations have 
typically emphasized an accommodating stance toward modernity, a proactive view on 
issues of social and economic justice, and pluralism in their tolerance of varied individual 
beliefs” (293-294).  Conversely, Evangelical denominations “have typically sought more 
separation from the broader culture, emphasized missionary activity and individual 
conversion, and taught strict adherence to particular religious doctrines” (294).  This 
method is considered an improvement over previous classification schemes because it 
more accurately organizes Mainline and Evangelical Protestants and is better able to 
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study trends in American religion because of more accurate classification of all 
denominations.    
In both this sample and nationally, the four groups included as independent 
variables are the largest and encapsulate most of the total population.  According to a 
2007 survey conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Evangelical 
Protestants are the largest group at 26.3%, followed closely by Catholics (23.9%), then 
Mainline Protestants (18.1%), and lastly Unaffiliated (16.1%).  This sample of 
Nebraskans shows similar numbers for who the four largest groups are, but Catholics 
have the most members at 25.0%, followed by Mainline Protestants (20.8%), Evangelical 
Protestants (18.3%), and Unaffiliated (12.9%).  Those labeled as unaffiliated answered no 
to the question “Regardless of whether you now attend religious services, do you identify 
with any particular religious tradition, denomination, or church?”  Those who did not fit 
into one of these four groups (such as those who identified as Jewish or Muslims) were 
dropped from the analysis because they made up a very small proportion of the total n.  
Also, because the Protestant groups required a longer line of questioning to determine 
RELTRAD classification, it is possible that more Protestants were dropped from the 
survey before being placed into one of the four groups.   
A variable was also created to indicate those who affiliate with any of the three 
religious groups.  Affiliated is labeled as 1= Catholic, Mainline Protestant, or Evangelical 
Protestant and 0= Unaffiliated.  Refer to Table 3 for the distribution and n’s for the 
religious groups.    
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
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 As discussed above, church attendance may affect immigration attitudes 
separately from religious affiliation.  Therefore, attendance is included and measured by 
the variable Frequent Attendance (1= “several times a week” or “once a week” and 0= 
“nearly every week”, “about once a month”, “several times a year”, “about once a year”, 
“less than once a year”, and “never”.  Over half of respondents said they were frequent 
attendees (55.4%).  Refer to Table 3 for distribution and n’s of the attendance variables.   
 
Controls 
 Researchers have found many possible determinants of immigration attitudes.  
These previous findings guided the selection of control variables.  Education is measured 
by Some College (1= “some college, but no degree” or “technical/associate/junior 
college”) and Bachelor’s Degree or Higher (1= “bachelor’s degree” or “graduate 
degree”).  Those with a high school diploma or less are the omitted category.  Age is 
measured continuously by the respondent’s age at the time of completing the survey.  
Female is the respondent’s sex (1= “female”).  Political ideology was measured by 
liberal (1= “very liberal” and “liberal”) and conservative (1= “conservative” and “very 
conservative”).  Those who responded “middle-of-the-road” are the omitted category.  
All respondents who did not answer “white (Caucasian)” were collapsed into the control 
variable nonwhite (Minorities make up only 5.7% of the sample).  Urbanity is measured 
by urban (1= “town or city”, 0= “farm” and “open country but not a farm”).  Income was 
recoded to a five-category variable consisting of equal $25,000 increments to facilitate 
24 
 
interpretation (1= $24,999 or less and 5= $100,000 or more).  Refer to Table 3 for 
distribution and n’s of these variables.   
 
METHOD 
 I use Binary Logistic Regression (Long 1997) as my analysis technique.  This 
statistical method allows for determining the differential outcomes that the independent 
variables have on the outcome of the dependent variable.  Odds ratios were used to 
calculate the likelihood of respondents agreeing with each dependent variable or the 
likelihood they believed each statement was more likely with immigration.   
The analysis contains seven models.  Model 1 tests the focal relationship between 
having a religious affiliation and immigration attitudes. This model only includes 
variables measuring religious affiliation for each of the seven dependent variables. 
According to Hypothesis 1 and the ethnoreligious perspective that posits that there is an 
association between religious affiliation and individual attitudes, those who affiliate 
should have more positive attitudes towards immigration.   
Model 2 includes the control variables to examine their effect on the focal 
relationship between religious affiliation and immigration attitudes.  A reduction of any 
significant findings from Model 1 could be interpreted as moderating the effect of the 
controls on the focal relationship. 
Model 3 tests the effect of specific religious affiliation on immigration attitudes, 
with Catholic and Evangelical Protestant as independent variables (Those who are 
unaffiliated are dropped from this and later models, bringing the total n to 965).  Here we 
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can test Hypothesis 2, the prediction that both the ethnoreligious perspective and Social 
Identity theory will apply and Catholics will have more positive attitudes towards 
immigrants than the other religious groups.  We will also be able to check for any 
unexpected variation not predicted by our hypotheses among the three religious groups in 
how they are associated with immigration attitudes.  Mainline Protestant is the omitted 
category in this model.   
Model 4 adds control variables to the relationship between religious affiliation 
and immigration attitudes.  Similar to Model 2, we can examine whether the control 
variables are influencing this focal relationship, except here those who affiliate are 
divided into separate religious groups.  Again, a disappearance of any significant findings 
from Model 3 would suggest it is one of the control variables influencing results 
indicating a moderating relationship between religious groups and immigration attitudes.   
Model 5 tests only church attendance on the dependent variables.  This allows us 
to test Hypothesis 3 and the religious restructuralism perspective, which posits that 
church attendance improves attitudes regardless of religious affiliation.  The added 
variable of church attendance should be associated with more positive attitudes if 
Hypothesis 3 applies.  
Model 6 adds control variables to the focal relationship between church 
attendance and immigration attitudes.  Again, a disappearance of any significant findings 
could mean that it is control variables- and not church attendance- which is causing 
differences in attitudes between frequent attendees and non-frequent attendees in Model 
5.  However, significant findings in this model between frequent attendance and positive 
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immigration attitudes would further support Hypothesis 3 and the religious 
restructuralism perspective.   
Model 7 includes each religious group, attendance, and the control variables.  
This allows for the testing of Hypotheses 2 and 3 simultaneously to see if there are 
changes from Models 3 through 6 and allows for the testing of the focal relationships of 
religious group and attendance on immigration attitudes.  This model is needed, for 
example, because differences in levels of attendance could have an effect on the 
relationship between religious groups and not actual differences in attitudes between 
them
1
.   
Mainline Protestants are the omitted category in Models 3, 4, and 7.  This change 
was necessary because the unaffiliated are not included in Models 3, 4, and 7 as these 
models compare immigration attitudes only among those who attend religious services.  
For the control variables, “high school or lower” for the education variables and 
“moderate” for the political ideology variables were the omitted categories.   
 
  RESULTS 
  Results from the analyses can be seen in Tables 4 through 10.  Model 1 examines 
only the relationship between affiliating with a religious group regressed on immigration 
attitudes.  None of the seven variables in this model had a significant relationship with 
those having a religious affiliation (“immigrants improve the economy of my 
community”, “the government spends too much money assisting immigrants”, 
                                                          
1
 An eighth model including interactions between religious groups and attendance was run but did not 
produce statistically significant results. 
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“immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural diversity of my community”, “people born 
in my community losing their jobs”, “higher economic growth”, “higher crime rates”, and 
“making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”).    
(TABLES 4 THROUGH 10 ABOUT HERE) 
 Model 2 again indicates no significant relationship between the affiliated and any 
of the seven dependent variables after including the control variables in the analysis.  
Having a bachelor’s degree or higher was significant for six of the seven dependent 
variables and was associated with more positive attitudes (p≤0.001).  Some of the other 
control variables also had a significant relationship with a majority (4 out of 7) of the 
dependent variables at a significance level of at least 0.05 (liberal, nonwhite, and urban).  
All three of these control variables were associated with more positive attitudes towards 
immigration.   
 Models 3 and 4 follow the same form as the previous two models but compare 
only the three religious groups to each other, with those who are unaffiliated dropped 
from the analysis.  Model 3 examines only the relationship between religious affiliation 
and immigration attitudes, with Mainline Protestants as the omitted category.  None of 
the religious groups had a significant association with any of the immigration attitudes 
variables, although the odds of Evangelicals agreeing with the variable “Immigrants 
improve the economy of my community” were somewhat less than Mainlines (p≤0.10).   
 Model 4 adds demographic controls to the focal relationship.  The odds of 
Evangelicals agreeing that “Immigrants improve the economy of my community” were 
36 percent less, with the variable moving from marginally significant to significant from 
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Model 4 to Model 3 (p≤  0.05).  Evangelicals also moved to marginal significance for the 
other variable regarding the economy; the odds of them responding that “higher 
economic growth” was a likely outcome as a result of more immigration were 31 percent 
less than Mainlines (p≤ 0.10).  The odds of Catholics responding that it is likely that 
immigration is “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures” were 28 
percent less, but this was also just marginally significant (p≤ 0.10).  Similar to Model 2, 
many of the controls were significant.  Having at least a bachelor’s degree was associated 
with more positive attitudes towards immigration in 6 of the 7 variables at a significance 
level of 0.001.   The control variables liberal, nonwhite, and urban were associated with 
more positive attitudes for 3 of the 7 variables at a significance level of at least 0.05.  
Increasing age of the respondent corresponded to more negative attitudes also for 3 
variables at a significance level of at least 0.05.   
 Model 5 introduces attendance into the analysis as an independent variable.  
Higher attendance seems to be associated with more positive attitudes for some of the 
variables.  The odds of frequent attendees agreeing that the “government spends too 
much money assisting immigrants” were 30 percent less than infrequent attendees (p≤ 
0.05).  The odds of them responding that “higher crime rates” are likely as a result of 
higher immigration were also 27 percent less (p≤ 0.05)  Finally, the odds of frequent 
attendees responding that immigration is “making my community more open to new 
ideas and cultures” were 30 percent more but only at a significance level of 0.10.   
 Model 6 added the control variables to the analysis between attendance and 
attitudes towards immigration.  Both of the findings from Model 5 remain significant.  
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The odds of frequent attendees agreeing that the “government spends too much money 
assisting immigrants” were 37 percent less than infrequent attendees, and the odds of 
them responding that “higher crime rates” are likely as a result of higher immigration 
were 35 percent less (p≤ 0.05).  The finding that was marginally significant in Model 5 
(that the odds of frequent attendees responding that immigration is “making my 
community more open to new ideas and cultures” were more than infrequent attendees) 
changed to nonsignificance.   
Again, holding at least a bachelor’s degree was associated with more positive 
attitudes for 6 of the 7 variables at a significance level of at least 0.01.  Female, liberal, 
and urban were all associated with more positive attitudes for 3 of the 7 variables at a 
significance level of at least 0.05 as was nonwhite at a significance level of at least 0.01.  
Again, increasing age was associated with more negative attitudes for 4 variables at a 
significance level of at least 0.05.   
 Model 7 included the religious groups and attendance together in the analysis.  
Many of the findings from the previous models remained the same.  The odds of 
Evangelicals agreeing that “immigrants improve the economy of my community” were 
40 percent less than Mainlines (a change from 36 percent in Model 4) (p≤ 0.05).   They 
also again approached significance for the variable “higher economic growth”, where the 
odds of them believing that growth was likely as a result of higher immigration were 30 
percent less (previously 31 percent) (p≤ 0.10).  In this model only, the odds of Catholics 
believing that more immigration is “making my community more open to new ideas and 
cultures” were 32 percent less at a significance level of 0.05.  This was a change from 
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Model 4 where there was only marginal significance.  The odds of frequent attendees 
agreeing that the “government spends too much money assisting immigrants” were again 
less than infrequent attendees at a significance level of 0.05 (moving only from 37 
percent less likely to 36 percent less likely).  The odds of them believing that “higher 
crime rates” are likely as a result of higher immigration were again 35 percent less (p≤ 
0.05).     
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This study examines whether religious affiliation or attendance to religious 
services is associated with immigration attitudes among Nebraskans.  Very little research 
has been done on this topic, and the research that has been done has shown that one’s 
religion can be an important factor in possibly shaping these attitudes.  No known studies 
have focused only on a Midwest population, where recent high immigration patterns 
compared to the past could create a more complex relationship between religion and 
immigration attitudes.  This study attempts to fill this gap by utilizing a survey where 
measures exist on religious affiliation, attendance, and many possible facets of how 
people express positive or negative feelings on immigration.   
 Results support previous findings that age, political ideology, race, education, 
gender and urbanity are all associated with immigration attitudes.  There are greater odds 
that those who are liberal, nonwhite, female, hold at least a bachelor’s degree, and who 
live in an urban area hold more positive immigration attitudes on many of the measures 
used here.  Holding at least a bachelor’s degree was particularly notable in determining 
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more positive attitudes for most of the dependent variables.  Also, age was negatively 
associated with most of the measures; as age increases, attitudes become more negative.   
 Hypothesis 1 was not supported by the data; respondents who affiliated with one 
of the three religious groups analyzed here did not have more positive attitudes towards 
immigration compared to those who do not affiliate after control variables were added to 
the analysis.  This means that the ethnoreligious perspective was not supported because 
respondents did not mirror the positive messages of their respective churches.  Findings 
here contradict Green (2007) and his theory that identifying with a church that espouses 
certain attitudes through doctrine and messaging would lead to similar attitudes in 
individual members.  The religious groups all have positive statements from church 
doctrine and leaders on immigrants and immigration, but this was not reflected in the 
data, at least as it compares to those who are unaffiliated.    
Hypothesis 2 also was not supported; Catholics did not hold more positive 
attitudes towards immigration that the other religious groups.  Social Identity theory, 
through the commonality of identifying as Catholic, did not result in improved attitudes 
by Catholic respondents towards mostly Catholic immigrants to Nebraska.  More 
surprising was the outcome that Catholics actually held more negative attitudes for the 
item that immigration is “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”.  
However, Social Identity theory may be working other ways if non-immigrant Catholics 
are perceiving immigrants as more of an out-group which supersedes their Catholic 
commonality.  Another possible explanation is that non-immigrant Catholics are failing 
to recognize that the majority of the new immigrants are Catholic at all.   
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Evangelicals held negative attitudes for some of the dependent variables when 
compared to Mainlines.  The odds of them agreeing that immigrants improve the 
economy and the odds of them believing that higher levels of immigration were not going 
to lead to economic growth were both less than Mainlines, although the latter held only 
marginal significance.  These findings partially reflect results from McDaniel et al. 
(2011), where Evangelicals held more negative attitudes on an index of measures which 
included economic items.  Results here are also similar to findings by Daniels and Von 
der Ruhr from 2003 and 2005 that showed that Evangelicals were not in favor of 
increased levels of immigration.  Although not addressing the economy directly, perhaps 
Evangelicals from these studies were against immigration for fear it would damage the 
economy.  McDaniel et al. (2011) posit that negative attitudes on immigration held by 
Evangelicals could be the result of Christian nationalism, a theory in which Evangelicals 
are more likely to feel that immigration is a threat to an existing American identity.  It 
should be noted, however, that in this study, Evangelicals only responded negatively to 
these economic indicators and no differently than other religious groups for any of the 
five other dependent variables which included more common indicators of threat (higher 
crime rates and loss of jobs, for example).     
The non-significant relationship between religious affiliation and immigration 
attitudes compared to what the ethnoreligious perspective suggests could be the result of 
regional differences in denominational practices and beliefs of a Midwestern compared to 
a national sample.  Another possibility is that Nebraskans hold more similar attitudes 
regardless of religious affiliation, perhaps because of recent increases in the foreign-born 
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population, higher concentrations of Hispanics in the Midwest, and the perception that 
immigration is a new phenomenon to the area.  Less variation in attitudes becomes more 
possible when people respond to a “hot-button” issue and churches’ teachings or other 
organizational efforts lag behind in their ability to influence attitudes. 
Although Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported, results indicate support for 
Hypothesis 3.  Attending religious services at least once a week, regardless of affiliation, 
was associated with more positive attitudes in two of the dependent variables.  The odds 
of frequent attendees agreeing that the government spends too much money assisting 
immigrants were 36 percent less than infrequent attendees, and the odds of them 
believing that immigration would lead to higher crime rates were 35 percent less.  This 
lends support for the religious restructuralism perspective where attending religious 
services has more of an influence on individual attitudes than simply identifying with a 
certain religion.  In other words, the importance of attendance could be the reason 
Hypothesis 1 was not supported.  In order for the church’s positive messages about 
immigration to reach church members, actually attending services is a key component, 
not solely identifying with that church, at least for these indicators.  This supports 
Green’s idea that those who attend church services at higher levels are more “religiously 
salient”, meaning that those who attend more often allow their religion to more strongly 
influence their lives.  Many previous researchers also noted the value of church 
attendance in leading to more positive attitudes towards immigration (Lee 2002; Zaller 
1992; Brenneman 2008; Knoll 2009).   
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Regarding the main finding that attendance can help to improve immigration 
attitudes, it is especially important to note that church attendance is oftentimes over 
reported (Marler and Chaves 1993; Presser 1998).  In self-administered surveys, social 
desirability bias can easily occur, particularly in regions where it is socially expected for 
people to attend church.  When such a large proportion of the sample (42.2%) claims to 
attend church at least once per week, it is logical to expect that the actual attendance rate 
is at least somewhat lower.   
If respondents are overreporting attendance and attendance is correlated with 
more positive attitudes, then I might be overestimating the importance attendance has.  
For example, if a respondent reports that they are a frequent attendee and that they have 
more positive attitudes but they actually are an infrequent attendee, it may be another 
variable altogether influencing both the drive to be seen as a regular church attendee and 
someone who is positive towards immigrants.  Any issues with self-reporting are going to 
mask the relationship between the effect of attendance on immigration attitudes.    
However, I may be instead suppressing the importance of attendance by 
overreporting those who are frequent attendees.  Again, those who claim they attend 
church at least once a week may actually attend less often.  Therefore, the actual attitudes 
of those who are frequent attendees (which would theoretically be more positive than 
infrequent attendees) would be partially clouded by those who are overreporting 
attendance.   
Although to a lesser extent, social desirability bias may also be occurring with the 
questions on what respondents believe about immigration.  Respondents may be more 
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likely to report positive attitudes in a survey when their actual attitudes towards 
immigrants are more negative (although much of the immigration measures here indicate 
largely negative attitudes).  This has been found to occur with surveys on immigration 
(Ural 2009) and race, especially when an interviewer is involved (Kryson 1998).  
However, because this is a telephone survey, the effect of social desirability may be 
reduced.  It also may be less of a factor here because the dependent variables ask about 
immigration attitudes and not racial attitudes directly, although much of the immigrant 
population are racial minorities.   
 Another limitation of this study is in how some of the immigration attitudes items 
are worded.  The respondent is asked how immigration might affect only their 
community, not Nebraska or the United States in general.  This wording may create 
variance in responses in a state like Nebraska where immigration rates are highly 
concentrated to certain areas.  For example, for the item “Immigrants improve the ethnic 
and cultural diversity of my community”, some respondents may answer no simply 
because they recognize immigration rates to their community is low, not because they 
hold negative attitudes.  Fortunately, most of the items ask about what effect might occur 
as a result of hypothetically more immigrants to their community, not the effect of 
current immigration.   
 An association between church attendance and attitudes was found, but it may not 
be church attendance which actually causes improved attitudes.  Some third variable, 
such as a drive to be engaged in and improve the community, could be driving both 
church attendance and improved immigration attitudes.  A longitudinal study would be 
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helpful to begin disentangling causality, where infrequent church attendees are surveyed 
after a period of increased attendance about their immigration attitudes.  It is certainly 
possible, however, that attending church would improve attitudes given the largely 
positive message of church doctrine and teachings towards immigration. 
 In addition to possibly conducting a longitudinal study, future research could 
continue to look at regional differences in how religious variables might affect 
immigration attitudes.  Because of historical differences in immigration rates and 
settlement patterns, how or if religious affiliation and/or attendance affect immigration 
attitudes may vary among smaller regions within the U.S.  It would be interesting to 
analyze how immigration rates to a certain region affect this relationship.  Do places with 
high or low immigration rates show that religion can make immigration attitudes more 
positive?  For example, if immigration rates are high, possible contact with immigrants 
within and outside churches could affect the relationship between religious affiliation or 
attendance and immigration attitudes.   
 Qualitative research examining if or how respondents believe their religious 
affiliation or attendance affects their attitudes on immigration would add significantly to 
the current research.  Themes on exactly how this relationship works could better 
translate church doctrine and teachings into useful methods to improve attitudes.  This 
information would also allow us to analyze the actual effect church clergy and the official 
stance on immigration have and whether and how the messages are being transferred 
from clergy to congregants.   
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This study was able to fill a gap in the literature concerning the possible effect of 
religious affiliation and attendance on immigration attitudes.  The few past studies 
looking at this relationship did not have such a thorough measure of the dependent 
measures of attitudes.  This study utilized seven separate items regarding a variety of 
immigration topics in a region where attitudes may differ from national samples.  The 
comprehensive measures of various topics of immigration covered here along with the 
differences in findings depending on the dependent variable show that future studies 
should consider keeping items on immigration attitudes separate for analysis.  Instead of 
one index of all items, respondents were free to differ in their attitudes among the various 
topics of immigration.  For example, Evangelicals expressed negative attitudes on the 
economy but were no different than the other religious groups on topics such as crime, 
jobs, and government spending. 
Results here point to the possibility that church attendance can help to improve 
immigration attitudes.  If we can further examine how this relationship works, it will be 
easier to utilize churches and their message in the organized efforts to ease tension 
between the foreign and native-born populations.  Indeed, churches have already joined 
in the movement to improve attitudes towards immigrants.  If we can further understand 
which methods best improve attitudes through this already-existing social network, we 
will be able to help communities be more open to these newcomers.   
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
REFERENCES 
Bean, Clive. 1995. “Determinants of Attitudes towards Questions of Border Maintenance 
in Australia.” People and Places 3(3):32-40. 
Bean, Frank D., Mark A. Fossett, and Kyung T. Park 2000. “Labor Market Dynamics and 
the Effects of Immigration on African Americans.” Pp. 143-162 in Immigration and 
Race: New Challenges for American Democracy, edited by Gerald D. Jaynes. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Betts, Katharine. 1988. Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976-1987. Melbourne, 
Australia: Melbourne University Press. 
Beutel, Ann M. and Margaret M. Marini. 1995. “Gender and Values.” American 
Sociological Review 60:436-448. 
Brenneman, Robert. 2008. Faith and the Foreigner: Exploring the Impact of Religion on 
Immigration Attitudes. Saarbrucken, Germany: VDM Publishing. 
Burns, Peter and James G. Gimpel. 2000. “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, 
and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy.” Political Science Quarterly 115(2):201-225. 
Campbell, David E. and J. Q. Monson. 2003. “Following the Leader? Mormon Voting on 
Ballot Propositions.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42(4):605-619. 
Chandler, Charles and Yung-mei Tsai. 2001. “Social Factors Influencing Immigration 
Attitudes: An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey.” The Social Science 
Journal 38(2):177-188. 
Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong. 1997. “Public 
Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations.” The Journal 
of Politics 59(3):858-881. 
Citrin, Jack, Beth Reingold, and Donald P. Green. 1990. “American Identity and the 
Politics of Ethnic Change.” The Journal of Politics 52:1124-1154. 
Cross, Susan E. and Laura Madson. 1997. “Models of the Self: Self-Construals and 
Gender.” Psychological Bulletin 122(1):5-37. 
Dalla, Rochelle, Amy Ellis, and Sheran Cramer. 2005. “Immigration and Rural 
America.” Community, Work & Family 8(2):163-185. 
49 
 
Daniels, Joseph and Marc Von Der Ruhr. 2005. “God and the Global Economy: Religion 
and Attitudes towards Trade and Immigration in the United States.” Socio-Economic 
Review 3(3):467-489. 
Djupe, Paul A. and Christopher P. Gilbert. 2002. “The Political Voice of Clergy.” 
Journal of Politics 64(2):596-609. 
Dustmann, Christian and Ian P. Preston. 2007. “Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes 
to Immigration.” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 7(1):Article 62. 
Espenshade, Thomas and Katherine Hempstead. 1996. “Contemporary American 
Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration.” International Migration Review 30(2):535-570. 
Fennelly, Katherine and Christopher Federico. 2008. “Rural Residence as a Determinant 
of Attitudes toward U.S. Immigration Policy.” International Migration 46(1):151-190. 
Fry, Richard. 2008. “Latino Settlement in the New Century.” Pew Hispanic Center. 
Retrieved April 10, 2010 (http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/96.pdf). 
Gilbert, Kathy L. 2007. “Immigration meeting urges hospitality to strangers.” The United 
Methodist Church. Retrieved April 10, 2010 
(http://www.umc.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=lwL4KnN1LtH&b=2429869&ct=3531
605). 
Green, John C. 2007. The Faith Factor: How Religion Influences American Elections. 
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. 
Greenberg, Stan; Greenberg, Anna; Hootkin, Julie; Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of 
Public Affairs; Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research. 2004. The Changing Shape of 
Minnesota: Reinvigorating Community and Government in the New Minnesota. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota. 
Griswold, Frank T. 2006. “Presiding Bishop’s statement on immigration policy.” The 
Episcopal Church. Retrieved April 10, 2010 
(http://www.episcopalchurch.org/3687_73490_ENG_HTM.htm). 
Hadden, Jeffrey K. 1969. The Gathering Storm in the Churches. Doubleday. 
Hamil-Luker, Jenifer and Christian Smith. 1998. “Religious Authority and Public 
Opinion on the Right to Die.” Sociology of Religion 59(4):373-391. 
50 
 
Haubert, Jeannie and Elizabeth Fussell. 2006. “Explaining Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in 
the U.S.: Social Class, Cosmopolitanism, and Perceptions of Immigrants.” International 
Migration Review 40(3):489-507. 
Hogg, Michael A., Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White. 1995. “A Tale of Two 
Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory.” Social 
Science Quarterly 58(4):255-269. 
Hood, M.V. and Irwin L. Morris. 1998. “Give us your Tired, your Poor.But Make Sure 
they have a Green Card: The Effects of Documented and Undocumented Migrant Context 
on Anglo Opinion toward Immigration.” Political Behavior 20(1):1-15. 
Johnson, Monica K. and Margaret M. Marini. 1998. “Bridging the Racial Divide in the 
United States: The Effect of Gender.” Social Psychology Quarterly 61(3):247-258. 
Knoll, Benjamin. 2009. “"And Who is my Neighbor?" Religion and Immigration Policy 
Attitudes.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 48(2):313-331. 
Land, Richard. 2006. “Immigration Crisis Requires Biblical Response.” The Ethics and 
Religious Liberty Commission. Retrieved April 10, 2010 
(http://erlc.com/article/immigration-crisis-requires-biblical-response/). 
Lee, Jenny J. 2002. “Religion and College Attendance: Change among Students.” The 
Review of Higher Education 25(4):369-384. 
Legge, Jr., J. S. 1983. “The Determinants of Attitudes toward Abortion in the American 
Electorate.” The Western Political Quarterly 36(3):479-490. 
Mayda, Anna M. 2006. “Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of 
Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 
88(3):510-530. 
McDaniel, Eric, Irfan Nooruddin, and Allyson Shortle. 2011. “Divine Boundaries: How 
Religion Shapes Citizens' Attitudes Toward Immigrants.” American Politics Research 
39(1):205-233. 
McIntosh, William A. 1979. “The Differential Impact of Religious Preference and 
Church Attendance on Attitudes towards Abortion.” Review of Religious Research 
20(2):195-213. 
McLaren, Lauren M. 1996. “Individual and Contextual Explanations of Support for the 
Rights of Immigrants in Western Europe.” PhD Dissertation, Department of Political 
Science, University of Houston, Houston, TX. 
51 
 
Michaud, Kristy. 2009. “The Good Steward.” Working paper, Department of Political 
Science, California State University, Northridge. 
Migration Policy Institute. 2011. “2010 American Community Survey and Census Data 
on the Foreign Born by State.” MPI Data Hub: Migration Facts, Stats, and Maps. 
Retrieved September 27, 2011 
(http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/acscensus.cfm#rankings). 
Moore, Stephen. 1986. “Social Scientists' Views on Immigrants and U.S. Immigration 
Policy.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 487:213-
217. 
National Association of Evangelicals. 2009. “Immigration 2009.” Retrieved October 6, 
2011 (http://www.nae.net/government-relations/policy-resolutions/354-immigration-
2009). 
Ortega, Francesc and Javier G. Polavieja. 2010. “Labor-market Exposure as a 
Determinant of Attitudes toward Immigration.” Center for Advanced Study in the Social 
Sciences, Madrid. 
Passel, Jeffrey and D'Vera Cohn. 2009. “Mexican Immigrants: How Many Come? How 
Many Leave?” Pew Hispanic Center. Retrieved September 27, 2011 
(http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=112). 
Pew Hispanic Center. 2009. “Changing Faiths: Latinos and the Transformation of 
American Religion.” Retrieved April 10, 2010 
(http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/75.1.pdf). 
Presbyterian Church (USA) Office of Immigration Issues. 2006. “Presbyterian Policy on 
Immigration.” Office of the General Assembly. Retrieved April 10, 2010 
(http://oga.pcusa.org/immigration/pdf/immigration-resolution-2006.pdf). 
Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. “Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population 
Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe.” American 
Sociological Review 60(4):586-611. 
Sikora, Joanna. 2009. “Religion and Attitudes Concerning Euthanasia.” Journal of 
Sociology 45(1):31-54. 
Simon, Rita J. 1985. Public Opinion and the Immigrant: Print Media Coverage, 1880-
1980. University of Michigan: Lexington Books. 
52 
 
Smidt, Corwin E., ed. 2004. Pulpit and Politics: Clergy in American Politics at the 
Advent of the Millenium. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press. 
Steensland, Brian, Jerry Z. Park, Mark D. Regnerus, Lynn D. Robinson, W. B. Wilcox, 
and Robert D. Woodberry. 2000. “The Measure of American Religion.” Social Forces 
79(1):291-318. 
Tajfel, Henri. 1982. “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.” Annual Review of 
Psychology 33:1-39. 
Tajfel, Henri and John Turner. 1979. The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. 
Monteray, California: Brooks/Cole. 
The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. 2010. “U.S. Religious Landscape Survey.” 
Retrieved October 6, 2011 (http://religions.pewforum.org/affiliations). 
U.S. Census Bureau. 2009. “Nebraska: Age and Sex.” American Community Survey 5-
year Estimates. Retrieved September 27, 2010 
(http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=04000US31&-
qr_name=ACS_2009_5YR_G00_S0101&-ds_name=ACS_2009_5YR_G00_&-
redoLog=false). 
United States Census Bureau 2010. 2011. “U.S. Census Bureau Delivers Nebraska's 2010 
Census Population Totals, Including First Look at Race and Hispanic Origin Data for 
Legislative Redistricting.” Census 2010. Retrieved September 27, 2011 
(http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/cb11-cn57.html). 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. 2002. “Migration and Refugee Services.” 
Retrieved April 10, 2010 (http://www.usccb.org/about/migration-and-refugee-services/). 
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: 
Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Von Der Ruhr, Marc and Joseph Daniels. 2003. “The Relationship between Religious 
Affiliation, Region, Race, and Attitudes towards Globalization.” Faith & Economics 
42:26-39. 
Vu, Michelle A. 2009. “Evangelicals make Case for Welcoming Immigrants.” The 
Christian Post. Retrieved October 6, 2011 
(http://www.christianpost.com/news/evangelicals-make-case-for-welcoming-immigrants-
37823/). 
53 
 
Wald, Kenneth D., Dennis E. Owen, and Jr., S. S. Hill. 1988. “Churches as Political 
Communities.” The American Political Science Review 82(2):531-548. 
Welch, Michael R. and David C. Leege. 1988. “Religious Predictors of Catholic 
Parishioners' Sociopolitical Attitudes: Devotional Style, Closeness to God, Imagery, and 
Agentic/Communal Religious Identity.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 
27(4):536-552. 
Whitehead, Andrew L. 2010. “Sacred Rights and Civil Rights: Religion's Effect on 
Attitudes toward Same-Sex Unions and the Perceived Cause of Homosexuality.” Social 
Science Quarterly 91(1):63-79. 
Wilson, Thomas C. 1994. “Trends in Tolerance toward Rightist and Leftist Groups, 
1976-1988: Effects of Attitude Change and Cohort Succession.” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 58(4):539-556. 
Wood, Peter B. and John P. Bartkowski. 2004. “Attribution Style and Public Policy 
Attitudes toward Gay Rights.” Social Science Quarterly 85(1):58-74. 
Zaller, John R. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
